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 The Likely Eﬀ ects of Employer-Mandated 
Complementary Health Insurance on Health 
Coverage in Francea
Aurélie Pierreb, Florence Jusotc
ABSTRACT: In France, access to health care greatly depends on having a Comple-
mentary Health Insurance coverage (CHI). Thus, the generalisation of  CHI became 
a core factor in the national health strategy created by the government in 2013. The 
fi rst measure has been to compulsorily extend employer-sponsored CHI to all private 
sector employees on January 1st, 2016 and improve its portability coverage for unem-
ployed former employees for up to 12 months. Based on data from the 2012 Health, 
Health Care and Insurance survey, this article provides a simulation of  the likely effects 
of  this mandate on CHI coverage and related inequalities in the general population by 
age, health status, socio-economic characteristics and time and risk preferences. We 
show that the non-coverage rate that was estimated to be 5% in 2012 will drop to 4% 
following the generalisation of  employer-sponsored CHI and to 3.7% after accounting 
for portability coverage. With its focus on private sector employees, the policy is likely 
to do little for populations that would benefi t most from additional insurance coverage 
while expanding coverage for other populations that appear to place little value on CHI. 
Indeed, the mandate could reduce the relationship between non-coverage and time and 
risk preferences without eliminating social inequalities as the most vulnerable popula-
tions are expected to remain more often without CHI.
JEL CODES: I13, D63.
KEYWORDS: Complementary Health Insurance, Inequality, Risk aversion, Time prefer-
ence, National Interprofessional Agreement, Simulation.
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1. Introduction
The goal of  health insurance is to protect individuals against the risk of  unexpected 
and catastrophic health expenditures. For effi ciency and equity arguments, this protec-
tion is mainly assured by public health insurance that covers higher than 70% of  health 
expenditures in most of  OECD countries, with a notable exception in the US where it 
only reaches 49% [1]. However, public insurance is always partial since it concerns either 
a limited basket of  care (e.g in Canada where drugs are out of  the public system or in 
Spain and in the UK where services provided by private physicians are uncovered), a 
limited population (as in the US where public coverage only covers old, vulnerable and 
poor populations) or since it lets copayments on a quite large basket of  care through 
coinsurance rates and deductibles (as in Belgium, in France or in Switzerland). As a 
consequence, private health insurances exist in most countries. They can be voluntary 
or compulsory through individual or employer mandates and their weight in health ex-
penditure fi nance increases with the fi nancial risk let by public coverage. Thus, private 
health insurances constitute a mainstay of  the health system in the US where they cover 
35% of  health expenditures mainly as primary health insurance. It is also the case in 
nearly every country with a universal public health insurance system, especially where 
there is no out-of-pocket expenditures ceiling such as in Canada and in France where 
private health insurances cover 13% and 14% respectively of  health expenditures [1]. 
In France, the health insurance system is characterized by the presence of  both pub-
lic health insurance and Complementary Health Insurance (CHI) in the same "basket 
of  care". Indeed, whereas public health insurance provides compulsory and universal 
health insurance that accounts for 77% of  overall health expenditure, copayments vary 
according to the type of  care, from 10% of  regular fees for hospital care to 30% for 
physicians visits and 85% for some drugs. Moreover, small deductibles exist for most 
of  care and extra fees can be particularly high for specialists, dental and optical care. 
Therefore out-of-pocket payments continuously increase with health care use and indi-
viduals with chronic illnesses can be faced catastrophic out-of-pocket expenditures left 
by the public scheme (despite the existence of  a specifi c device called "ALD" which 
offers extra public coverage for care related to a limited number of  diseases). Moreover, 
the French health system is characterised by the most important social inequalities in 
mortality in Europe [2]. This situation is partly explained by the large magnitude of  
inequalities in health care use (especially for specialist and preventive care) and in com-
plementary health coverage in comparison with other European countries [3–6]. The 
ability of  public health insurance to guarantee equitable access to care and to protect 
the sickest and the poorest against fi nancial burden related to diseases has been ques-
tioned and reforms have been suggested such as the introduction of  a out-of-pocket 
payment threshold funded on income proportional taxes [7–11]. However, due to fi nan-
cial constraints, policy makers have chosen to increase access to CHI rather than simply 
increase the comprehensiveness of  the public insurance program.
Two schemes designed to facilitate access to CHI for low-income populations, the 
"Universal Complementary Health Insurance" (called CMU-C) and "the Assistance in Financing 
Complementary Health Insurance" (called ACS), were introduced in 2000 and 2005, respec-
tively. Another way to promote CHI has been to support employer-sponsored health 
insurance by introducing tax and social contribution exemptions as early as 1985. As a 
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result, 95% of  the population benefi ted from CHI in 2012. However, access to CHI 
remains an issue for policy makers since non-coverage rate is greatly higher among 
the poorest [4,12–17]. This situation is partly due to the low inclusion threshold for 
the "CMU-C" device (20% below the poverty line), which only concerns 7% of  the 
population, and the very high non take-up rate of  the "ACS" device which offers quite 
low voucher amounts and still remains poorly known [18] whereas CHI premiums can 
reach 10% of  income for the poorest households [14,16]. Moreover, the level of  CHI 
coverage varies a lot in the population according to income and the way individuals are 
insured: employer sponsored-CHI coverage are on average more advantageous than 
contracts individually subscribed [19]. Thus, the promotion of  widespread access to a 
quality CHI became a core factor in the National Health Strategy set out by the French 
government on September 23rd, 2013, alongside the overall aim of  reducing social health 
inequalities [20]. This objective was fi rst implemented in the National Interprofessional 
Agreement ("Accord National Interprofessionnel" called ANI), which mandates that all pri-
vate sector employers offer partially fi nanced compulsory CHI to all of  their employees 
beginning on January 1st, 2016. This agreement also aimed to improve the portability of  
coverage for the unemployed for up to 12 months after the end of  their last job [21]. 
The ability of  mandating employers to offer health insurance to their employees in 
order to improve health insurance coverage and its equity can be discussed. Employer 
mandate allows policymakers to promote health insurance limiting public spending and 
the deadweight losses induced by taxation [22]. Employers can also negotiate better 
cost/ quality premiums. Regarding equity issue, it can be less equitable than standard 
public programs as it excludes individuals who are out of  the labour market and there-
fore who may be more frequently uninsured, economically deprived and in poor health. 
Moreover, since CHI premiums are not progressive, it doesn’t constitute an instrument 
of  redistribution, conversely to social contribution and income taxation. Finally, the im-
pact of  such a mandate on social welfare could be discussed since it prevents employees 
to choose their optimal level of  coverage according to their budget constraints and their 
preferences. Indeed, a number of  theoretical and empirical studies have highlighted 
the role of  risk preferences in the decision to be uninsured [23–30] and Marquis and 
Long [31] showed that implementing a mandate on primary health insurance that would 
require uninsured families to purchase health insurance may induce very high welfare 
costs, which refl ect a strong preference for remaining uninsured and/or a low willing-
ness to pay for health insurance.
Even if  employer-provided health insurances exist in many countries, employer man-
date is very rare. Today, only the employer mandate of  Hawaï has been evaluated, the 
employer mandate for companies over 50 employees having just been implemented in 
the US is an integral part of  the Affordable Care Act. Few studies have shown a posi-
tive impact of  employer-mandate on health insurance coverage of  full-time employees 
[32–34] but with a lower magnitude for part-time employees and the overall population 
[32,33,35]. However, the impact of  employer-mandate on inequalities in coverage re-
lated to socio-economic status and need for healthcare has not been properly explored. 
Moreover, no studies concern a country where public health insurance is universal and 
employer mandate would only concern complementary or supplementary health insur-
ance whereas due to pressure on public budgets, it is tempting for governments to set 
up such mandates to push some health spending from the public sector to the private 
sector.
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This article provides a simulation of  the likely effects of  the ANI mandate implemented 
in 2016 on CHI coverage and related inequalities in the general population. It questions 
its capacity to generalize access to CHI, to improve coverage equity and to enable those 
who would like to be insured to benefi t from a CHI coverage without constraining 
those who would prefer remaining uninsured. This work is based on data from the 
2012 French Health, Health Care and Insurance survey (called "ESPS"), which is the 
latest available survey in France that provides information on insurance coverage, health 
status, socio-economic characteristics and time and risk preferences. This ex-ante evalu-
ation of  the ANI is the fi rst one performed since this law has been negotiated by trade 
unions in counterpart of  more fl exibility on the labour market without any discussion 
concerning its impact on health insurance [21]. This study, that should be of  interest for 
French policy makers even if  it hasn’t been run upon their request, completes the litera-
ture on the implication of  employer-mandate on the generalisation of  health insurance 
coverage and its equity.
2. Context
2.1. CHI contracts in France
In France, CHI contracts can be purchased either through a private sector employ-
er, whether one’s own or that of  another member of  the household, or individually 
for public sector employees, self-employed individuals and people out of  employment. 
Before the ANI mandate, employer-provided CHI was voluntary for employers, volun-
tary or compulsory for employees, and sponsored by employers or not. According to 
the most recent public survey on "Group Complementary Social Protection", 44% of  
private sector employers already offered CHI to their employees in 2009; 94% of  them 
partially fi nanced the premiums, on average covering 56% of  the cost [36]. Additionally, 
89% covered spouses and children through an additional premium paid by employees.
Overall, in 2012, 34.7% of  the French population benefi ted from private sector em-
ployer-sponsored CHI either directly (16.2%) or through a household member's em-
ployer (18.5%), 53% benefi ted from individual CHI coverage, and 6% benefi ted from 
the CMU-C scheme [17]. As a result, 5% of  the population was not covered by a CHI 
contract, and 20% of  them were private sector employees. Among all uninsured, 53% 
explained that they could not afford insurance, and 12% stated that they did not wish to 
be insured or did not need insurance.
2.2. The employer’s mandate of  the ANI law
In January 2013, the ANI was signed by the majority of  trade unions with the aim 
of  improving 'company competitiveness, employment protection and employee career 
paths'. In return for greater labour market fl exibility, its includes two articles concern-
ing employer-sponsored CHI. First, it mandates that all private sector employers offer 
compulsory CHI to their employees that will be at least half  paid by the employers and 
respect minimum coverage requirements (full reimbursement of  copayments computed 
on the basis of  the regulated prices and some extra fees for dental and optical care). 
Second, it extends the maximum duration of  the portability coverage from 9 months to 
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12 months depending on the duration of  the last employment contract, which allows 
former employees entitled to unemployment benefi ts to maintain their employer-spon-
sored CHI. Voted into law on June 14th, 2013, the mandate for employer-sponsored 
CHI went into effect on January 1st, 2016 (see Franc and Pierre [21] for more details).
2.3. Employee exemptions
Several exemptions that already existed before the ANI law allow some employees to 
decline to subscribe to employer-provided CHI. It applies to employees who receive 
employer-sponsored CHI as a dependent of  a member of  their household, those who 
benefi t from the public schemes, employees in short-term contracts of  less than 12 
months, part-time employees for whom the fi nancial contribution to the premium 
would exceed 10% of  their income and when both the employer-provided CHI hasn’t 
been negotiated with trade unions and the premium isn’t fully paid by the employer.
3. Method
3.1. Analysis strategy
Our analysis proceeded in four parts. First, we described the non-coverage by CHI ob-
served in 2012, that is to say, before the implementation of  the law. Descriptive statistics 
were used for analysing inequalities in non-coverage according to age, health status, so-
cio-economic characteristics and time and risk preferences. A Probit model was run to 
highlight the main signifi cant determinants of  being uninsured. Confi dence intervals at 
5% were estimated using 500 bootstrapped samples. Second, we described the charac-
teristics of  the subpopulations targeted and not targeted by the law. Third, we simulated 
the likely effects of  the ANI law on the non-coverage rate of  the whole population and 
on inequalities in coverage. Finally, we provide a description of  the individuals who 
would gain CHI because of  the reform and of  those who would continue not to have it.
3.2. Data 
The 2012 Health, Health Care and Insurance Survey is a representative survey of  the 
French population that provides data on individuals' demographics, health status, so-
cio-economic characteristics and CHI coverage. Our sample was composed of  22,980 
individuals, 5% of  whom were not covered by CHI (Table A1). 
Three broad dimensions were considered as CHI coverage determinants: health risks, 
socio-economic status, and preferences related to risk and time. In addition to demo-
graphics, health risk is approximated by self-assessed health, by reporting having at 
least one chronic illness, and by the benefi ts of  the "Affection de Longue Durée" (ALD) 
scheme, which proposes public extra coverage for treatments related to some specifi c 
long term diseases. Socio-economic status was measured using the household income 
per consumption unit, employment status, a social vulnerability indicator that includes 
self-reported diffi culties in paying rent or liabilities and/or suffering from long-term 
isolation during the course of  life, and an indicator that targets individuals anticipating 
the inability to manage without some form of  material support if  faced with fi nancial 
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diffi culties. We approximated time and risk preferences though the following questions: 
'In terms of  your attitude regarding risk/the future, where would you place yourself  on 
a scale from 0 to 10? As previously done in the literature [37], we consider individuals 
who responded 8, 9 or 10 to the fi rst question as those with the lowest risk aversion and 
those who responded 0, 1 or 2 to the second question as being present-oriented. 
3.3. Simulations and assumptions
3.3.1. Simulation of  the CHI status
We consider that all individuals affected by the law will be insured after its implemen-
tation: the CHI status of  those uninsured before the law is changed as "being insured". 
All other individual characteristics remain the same. We thus assume that all employers 
will be compliant with the law given that employer participations to payment premi-
ums are exempted of  social taxes and that the ANI agreement has been signed by 
representatives of  both employers and employees. We also assume that income, health 
and employment status are exogenous with respect to the employer mandate. This lat-
ter assumption implies that the mandate will have no impact on labour supply and/
or demand, which is consistent with other French researches [32,38] and relevant in 
France given that the cost of  CHI is relatively small compared to total compensation. 
Moreover, a fl exible labour market is required to observe changes of  employees’ wag-
es, which is not the case in France where the minimum wage is one of  the highest in 
Europe [39]. Changes could eventually be observed on wages trends after many years. 
Finally, even if  being insured allows a better access to health care [6,40,41], potential 
changes on health status will take time and could not be observed in the short term.
3.3.2. Law enforcement scenarios
Three categories of  individuals were identifi ed as being affected by the law: 1) private 
sector employees directly affected by the employer mandate, 2) former private sector 
employees unemployed for fewer than twelve months directly affected by portability 
coverage and 3) dependents of  employees and former employees potentially indirectly 
affected by the ANI law. Indeed, although they are not mandated to do it, most employ-
ers provide contracts today that offer the possibility to include employees’ spouses and 
children under 26 years old who are students or economically inactive [36]. 
Thus, we considered three law enforcement scenarios. Scenario (1) evaluated only the 
impact of  the generalization of  employer-sponsored CHI for all private sectors employ-
ees who are the only ones to compulsorily take out CHI. Scenario (1+2) also accounted 
for the portability coverage of  former employees. Scenario (1+2+3) also included em-
ployees’ dependents.
3.3.3. Assumptions about employees’ exemptions
To simulate the non-coverage rate, we fi rstly assume that no employee will be exempt-
ed to the employer-sponsored CHI introduced by the ANI law, ignoring the fact that 
employees on fi xed-term employment contracts under 12 months can be exempted to 
subscribe to it without being covered otherwise. However, they are likely to request 
exemptions due to the transaction costs related to the temporary nature of  their em-
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ployment contracts and the fact that they can face a high employee contribution relative 
to their health risks. Our database provides information on the nature of  employment 
contract but not on the length of  fi xed-term contract. Given that in France, fi xed-term 
employment contracts are by the law limited to 18 months and only 21% of  them have a 
length over one month [42], we then assume in an alternative scenario that all employees 
on temporary employment contracts would be exempted from the employer-sponsored 
CHI such that their CHI status will remain the same as observed in 2012 after the re-
form. 
4. Results
4.1. Non-coverage in 2012
Among the whole population, the non-coverage rate was on average 5% in 2012. It was 
particularly high among individuals over 80 and between 18 and 30 years old (6.8% and 
8%, respectively, Table A2). Nearly 10% of  individuals with poor or very poor health 
were uninsured versus 4.6% of  those with very good health. Consistent with previous 
studies [12,13,15,16,43], access to complementary health insurance is strongly related to 
socio-economic status. In 2012, non-coverage was more common among low-income 
individuals (14.1% versus 3.6% among the more well-off) and the socially vulnerable. 
Regarding employment status, 13.7% of  the unemployed, 8.9% of  homemakers and 
11.6% of  other economically inactive individuals were uninsured, compared to 3.6% of  
employed people. As a result, socio-economic status, and especially income, is the main 
dimension associated with the probability of  not having CHI in 2012 (Table A3). All 
things being equal, the probability of  being uninsured is 10.2 percentage points higher 
for the poorest compared to the richest and 4.1 percentage points higher for the unem-
ployed compared to the employed. Moreover, we show for the fi rst time in France that 
time and risk preferences are associated with being insured by CHI. The non-coverage 
rate reaches 8.1% for individuals with low risk aversion (versus 4.4% for the others, Table 
A2) and 7.3% for those with a strong preference for the present (versus 4.2% for the oth-
ers), and these associations were signifi cant with all other things being equal (Table A3).
4.2. Characteristics of  the targeted populations
Nearly 55% of  the population will be either directly or indirectly targeted sub-populations 
of  the ANI law (Table A1). Private sector employees with open-ended contracts, the 
target of  the generalisation of  the employer-sponsored CHI without exemptions, 
correspond to 23.9% of  the population. Those with fi xed-term contracts, who can 
benefi t from exemptions, count for 3.7%. Former private sector employees who were 
unemployed less than twelve months and are targeted by the extension of  the portability 
coverage, represent only 1.6% of  the population. Dependents, who could indirectly 
benefi t from the ANI law, represent 27% of  the population. 
Private sector employees with open-ended contracts, the target of  the generalisation 
of  the employer-sponsored CHI without exemptions, are less often uninsured than 
employees with fi xed-term contracts (2.4% versus 10.8%). The situation for unemployed 
individuals affected by portability coverage was particularly worrying as 16.5% of  them 
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were without CHI in 2012. The non-coverage rate was 3.9% among potential depend-
ents and reached 6.2% among those who were neither directly nor indirectly targeted 
by the law. 
People affected by the law are younger and in better health status than those not affect-
ed by the law. Indeed, individuals who reported very good or good health make up 61% 
of  private sectors employees (whatever the length of  the contract), 53% of  individuals 
unemployed less than 12 months and 58% of  the potential dependents versus 47% of  
the rest of  the population. Private sector employees with open-ended contracts are also 
richer than those with fi xed contracts. Individuals with an income under 1,000€ per CU 
by month count for 8% of  the open-ended contract population versus 20% of  those 
with a fi xed-term contract and make up 25% of  the individuals unemployed less than 
12 months and 26% of  the rest of  the population. Finally, individuals with lower risk 
aversion and those with a higher preference for the present are more often represented 
among private sector employees with a fi xed-term contract, that is to say those who can 
be exempted from employer-sponsored CHI.
4.3. The simulation of  the effects of  ANI on non-coverage rates
4.3.1. The whole expected non-coverage rate
For the whole population, and under the assumption that no private sector employee 
will be exempted from the employer-sponsored CHI introduced after the mandate, 
results showed that the law would signifi cantly but slightly reduce the non-coverage 
rate from 5% to 4% in scenario (1) and 3.7% in scenario (1+2) [Table 1]. Thus, among 
the individuals without coverage in 2012, 79.9% and 74.5%, respectively, will remain 
uninsured. Only scenario (1+2+3), which accounts for dependents, would result in a 
signifi cant drop in non-coverage rates, even though 2.7% of  the population and more 
than half  of  the individuals without CHI in 2012 remained uncovered after the law. 
Accounting for likely exemptions by short-term employees caused an increase of  0.4 
points in the non-coverage rates for the general population. The non-coverage rate 
would remain signifi cantly positive among employees in the private sectors: 1.4% of  
Table 1. Non-coverage rate observed in 2012 and expected after the ANI law
Observed Simulated,assuming no employee exemptions
Simulated, assuming 
that all employees in short-term 
contracts will be exempted
In 2012 S (1) S (1+2) S (1+2+3) S (1) S (1+2) S (1+2+3)
Among the whole population 5.0 4.0 3.7 2.7 4.4 4.1 3.1
[4.7 ; 5.3] [3.7 ; 4.3] [3.4 ; 4.0] [2.4 ; 2.9] [4.1 ; 4.7] [3.8 ; 4.4] [2.8 ; 3.3]
Among those without CHI 
in 2012
100 79.9 74.5 53.5 87.9 82.6 61.8
[100 ; 100] [77.3 ; 82.4] [71.8 ; 77.2] [50.4 ; 56.7] [85.9 ; 90.0] [80.2 ; 84.9] [58.7 ; 64.8]
Among private employees 3.6 0 0 0 1.4 1.4 1.4
[3.1 ; 4.1] [0 ; 0] [0 ; 0] [0 ; 0] [1.1 ; 1.8] [1.1 ; 1.8] [1.1 ; 1.8]
Among private employees 
without CHI in 2012
100 0 0 0 40.1 40.1 40.1
[100 ; 100] [0 ; 0] [0 ; 0] [0 ; 0] [32.9 ; 47.3] [32.9 ; 47.3] [32.9 ; 47.3]
Source: ESPS, Irdes, 2012.
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them would remain uninsured (versus 3.6% in 2012), which corresponds to 40.1% of  
those already uninsured in 2012.
4.3.2. The expected effects on inequalities in coverage under the assumption 
that no employee will be exempted
Concerning scenarios (1) and (1+2), which address the direct effects of  the law, the re-
sults fi rstly showed that non-coverage would be signifi cantly reduced among individuals 
aged 18-30 years from 8% in 2012 to 5.6% and 4.5%, respectively (Table A2). However, 
this population would remain, along with the older population, without CHI more often 
(6.8% for those over 80). The results reveal a similar evolution of  the non-coverage rate 
among individuals in good and poor health, regardless of  the health status indicator 
used (-1 point in each sub-population), leaving more of  those with the poorest health 
status without CHI.
The non-coverage rate will obviously signifi cantly decrease among the working pop-
ulation in scenario (1) and among the unemployed in scenario (1+2). Non-coverage 
will nevertheless remain relatively high among the unemployed at 9% versus 1.2% in the 
working population in scenario (1+2). There is even a strengthening in the relationship 
between non-coverage and retirement in scenarios (1) and (1+2) [Table A3]. This also 
applies to students, homemakers, and unemployed individuals even though the short-
term unemployed are directly addressed in the law. 
Similarly, non-coverage rate will continue to signifi cantly decrease with income levels. 
Based on scenario (1+2), there would be a non-signifi cant drop of  10% in the non-
coverage rate among the poorest (from 14.1% to 12.7%) versus a signifi cant drop of  
56% among those with incomes between 2,001€ and 3,000€ (from 1.6% to 0.7%), the 
ceteris paribus association between income and non-coverage remaining quite similar 
after the law to that observed in 2012 (Table A3). Those results indicate that the man-
date is susceptible to increase income-related inequalities in CHI coverage. 
Furthermore, the results show a signifi cant and relatively important drop in non-
coverage rates among risk-seekers. Risk-seekers had a -3.2 pts decrease in non-coverage 
in scenario (1) versus -0.9 pts among the risk-averse. A similar trend was observed among 
individuals with the strongest preference for the present. They faced a -1.6 pts decrease 
in non-coverage in scenario (1) versus -1 pt among the others (Table A2). As a result, 
time and risk preferences would still no longer be signifi cantly associated with being 
uninsured all other things being equal (Table A3.).
If  we now consider the indirect effects of  the ANI on dependents (scenario (1+2+3)), 
the results showed that the non-coverage rate would decrease considerably among 
individuals under 30 years old, with a high level of  non-coverage only among older 
individuals. The non-coverage rate would also drop considerably among individuals 
in good health (for example, -2.6 points for those without long-term diseases versus 
-1.2 points for the others). Compared to scenarios (1) and (1+2), there would be a drop 
in the non-coverage rate among the economically inactive population, even though 
non -coverage would remain higher in this sub-population. Only scenario (1+2+3) does 
not increase the correlation, all other things being equal, between being economically 
inactive and non-coverage compared to those observed in 2012. 
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4.3.3. The likely effects of  employee exemptions on inequalities in coverage
Under the assumption that all employees on fi xed-term contracts will refuse to adhere to 
the employer-sponsored CHI scheme, some of  them will remain uninsured. Therefore, 
inequalities in non-coverage among the whole population will be increased to some 
extent by previous ones existing among employees before the reform. Indeed, in 2012, 
large differences in non-coverage existed among private sector employees according 
to individuals’ characteristics (Table A4). Younger employees were most affected by 
non-coverage (12.5% of  those under 20 versus approximately 3% of  those over 30). The 
non-coverage rate was also higher among employees in poor or very poor health (8.3% 
versus 4% among those in very good health), those on fi xed-term contracts (10.8% versus 
2.4% among employees with open-ended contracts) and those involuntarily working 
part-time (7.1% versus 3.3% among full-time workers). Finally, non-coverage was also 
more common among the poorest employees (11.2% compared to 1.8% among the 
richest) and those with the lowest risk aversion and the strongest preference for the 
present (8.8% and 7.8% versus 2.7% and 2.8%, respectively). 
As a consequence, accounting for likely exemptions by short-term employees, the 
non-coverage rate among the whole population would increase 6.9% for the 18-30 age 
group in scenario (1) versus 5.6% when we do not assume exemptions and 8% in 2012 
(Table A2). Only scenario (1+2+3) would signifi cantly reduce their non-coverage rate 
by 4.5% as they could benefi t from the ANI more than other age groups because they 
can be covered as dependents. The non-coverage rate of  risk-seekers is also weakly 
affected (6.6% under employee exemptions versus 4.9% without assuming exemptions). 
As a result, preferences would still be signifi cantly associated, all other things being 
equal, with not being insured, which was not the case without assuming exemptions. 
The results related to socio-economic variables and health status are by contrast quite 
similar assuming exemptions or not assuming exemptions.
4.4. Who would be the winners and the losers? 
Table A5 presents a description of  individuals who would gain CHI coverage because 
of  the reform, people who would remain without CHI and those who were already 
insured before the law. 
Individuals who would gain CHI coverage because of  the reform are quite young 
(38.4% of  them are less 30 years old in scenario (1+2)) and more than half  of  them 
are in good health (Table A5)). By contrast, people who would remain uninsured are 
all ages (41.5% of  them are under 30, 28.5% are between 31 and 60 and 30% are over 
60). Thus, compared to those who would gain CHI coverage, those who would re-
main uninsured are older and therefore more often in poor health (12.4% versus 4.5%). 
Individuals who would gain CHI coverage because of  the reform have a lower income 
than those who were already insured before the law. Nevertheless, people who would 
remain uninsured are more often in the lower income groups than others. Moreover, 
individuals who would gain CHI coverage are more often risk-seekers and present-ori-
ented than individuals who would remain uninsured (11.8% and 10.8% versus 8.6% and 
7.3%, respectively). Taking into account potential exemptions does not notably impact 
the results, except for risk and time preferences. Under this hypothesis, the proportion 
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of  risk-seekers and present-oriented individuals would be quite similar among the win-
ners and the losers. 
5. Discussion
This research provides an ex ante evaluation of  the Employer-Mandated CHI in France 
on its capacity to generalize CHI coverage on the overall population and to improve its 
equity without constraining those who would prefer remaining uninsured. 
The results moderate the effects to be expected from the law implemented in France in 
January 2016 to achieve the goal of  100% insurance coverage. Indeed, the non-cover-
age rate, estimated at 5% in 2012, would drop to 4% after the implementation of  em-
ployer-sponsored CHI for all employees, to 3.7% after the inclusion of  the short-term 
unemployed in the estimate and to 2.7% if  one assumes that employees’ dependents 
will also benefi t from this coverage. The results also moderate the expected effects of  
this law to improve equity in access to health insurance. Indeed, with its focus on private 
sector employees, the policy is likely to do little for populations who would benefi t most 
from additional insurance coverage while expanding coverage for other populations 
that appear to place little value on CHI. The former includes elderly adults who are 
unaffected by the policy because they are retired and the long-term unemployed. The 
latter includes healthy young adults with low expected medical expenditures. Although 
it is impossible with existing data to estimate the value that they place on CHI, the fact 
that individuals who currently lack CHI tend to be less risk averse and have a higher 
time discount rate suggests that many would prefer to receive additional compensation 
in the form of  cash wages rather than richer health insurance benefi ts. 
This study relies on methodological choices that need to be discussed. First, we have as-
sumed that all employers will be compliant with the law. Our results provide then an up-
per bound evaluation of  the effects on ANI on the non-coverage rate, since, as shown 
by Dick for the Hawaiian mandate (1994), the low compliance of  employers could 
reduce the employer-mandate effi cacy. However, the compliance of  employers is quite 
credible in the French context since employers have participated in the negotiation and 
they can benefi t from taxes exemption on premiums. Due to the lack of  information on 
the exact length of  their former contracts, all unemployed former employees for up to 
12 months are considered to be covered after the ANI implementation. However, the 
right to portability is restricted by the length of  the former job contract and those who 
were exempted when they were employed are in fact not eligible for the new CHI port-
ability. This assumption also overestimates the impact of  the ANI law on non -coverage. 
Regarding exemptions for employees on fi xed-term contracts, we have considered un-
der a fi rst assumption that all of  them would accept to be covered by their employer 
and in a second one, that all of  them would be exempted. Indeed, only a portion of  
them will probably choose to decline the employer-sponsored CHI. The non-coverage 
rate after ANI implementation of  4% (in the scenario 1) computed under the fi rst as-
sumption is therefore overestimated and the rate of  4.4% under the second assumption 
is underestimated. In return, we have not made assumption on part-time employees’ 
exemptions whereas they can also refuse to subscribe to the scheme as soon as their 
contributions exceed 10% of  their gross income. However, if  one assumes the lowest 
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possible employer contribution (50% of  the cost of  the contract), and if  we consider 
the average cost of  a group contract, estimated at 36.1€ per benefi ciary per month in 
2012 [19], the employee’s portion of  18€ for a single person exceeds 10% of  the gross 
income for less than 15% of  part-time employees paid at the French minimum gross 
salary (1,426€ for a full time job). 
6. Conclusion
This ex-ante evaluation should have been run before its implementation by social plan-
ners in order to examine its relevance. By moderating the effects to be expected from 
an employer mandate on non-coverage in France and on related inequalities, this study 
questions the trade-off  that policy makers face to manage the budget for the public 
program and to achieve equity goals. It thus raises a broader debate on the opportunity 
to implement such employer mandates inside and outside the French context. 
This study provides reliable results on the likely impact of  employer mandate on the 
generalisation of  health insurance coverage and its equity in the short term. However, it 
will be important to provide an ex-post evaluation of  the real impact of  the law on ac-
cess to CHI coverage, in particular in the long run, and to study its other consequences, 
notably on the health risk structure and quality and cost of  the CHI contract, depending 
on whether contracts are obtained through the employer or not. The potential conse-
quences on unemployment, wages and employment contract will have to be monitored 
as well. 
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Table A2 Non-coverage rates observed in 2012 and simulated in the entire population
Observed
in 2012
Simulated. assuming 
no employee exemptions
Simulated. assuming that all employees 
in short terms contract will be exempted
Scenario (1) Scenario (1+2) Scenario (1+2+3) Scenario (1) Scenario (1+2) Scenario (1+2+3)
% NC IC 95 % NC IC 95 % NC IC 95 % NC IC 95 % NC IC 95 % NC IC 95 % NC IC 95
Gender
Male 5.8 [5.3 ; 6.3] 4.5 [4.1 ; 4.9] 4.2 [3.7 ; 4.6] 3.1 [2.7 ; 3.5] 5.0 [4.5 ; 5.5] 4.7 [4.2 ; 5.1] 3.6 [3.2 ; 4.0]
Female 4.3 [3.9 ; 4.7] 3.5 [3.2 ; 3.9] 3.3 [3.0 ; 3.7] 2.3 [2.0 ; 2.6] 3.9 [3.5 ; 4.2] 3.6 [3.3 ; 4.0] 2.6 [2.2 ; 2.9]
Age
< 18 years old 4.0 [3.4 ; 4.6] 4.0 [3.4 ; 4.6] 4,0 [3.4 ; 4.6] 1.3 [1.0 ; 1.7] 4.0 [3.4 ; 4.6] 4.0 [3.4 ; 4.6] 1.6 [1.2 ; 2.0]
18/30 years old 8.0 [7.0 ; 8.9] 5.6 [4.8 ; 6.3] 4.5 [3.8 ; 5.2] 3.2 [2.5 ; 3.8] 6.9 [6.0 ; 7.9] 5.9 [5.1 ; 6.8] 4.5 [3.8 ; 5.3]
31/40 years old 4.9 [4.0 ; 5.8] 3.2 [2.4 ; 3.9] 2.5 [1.8 ; 3.2] 1.9 [1.2 ; 2.5] 3.9 [3.1 ; 4.8] 3.3 [2.5 ; 4.0] 2.3 [1.6 ; 3.0]
41/50 years old 4.6 [3.7 ; 5.5] 2.7 [2.1 ; 3.4] 2.6 [1.9 ; 3.2] 2.0 [1.4 ; 2.7] 3.2 [2.5 ; 3.9] 3.1 [2.3 ; 3.8] 2.4 [1.8 ; 3.1]
51/60 years old 4.2 [3.5 ; 5.0] 2.9 [2.3 ; 3.6] 2.9 [2.3 ; 3.5] 2.4 [1.8 ; 3.0] 3.2 [2.6 ; 3.9] 3.2 [2.5 ; 3.8] 2.6 [2.0 ; 3.2]
61/70 years old 4.2 [3.3 ; 5.1] 4.1 [3.2 ; 5.0] 4.1 [3.2 ; 5.0] 3.8 [2.9 ; 4.7] 4.1 [3.2 ; 5.0] 4.1 [3.2 ; 5.0] 3.9 [3.0 ; 4.8]
70/80 years old 4.3 [3.1 ; 5.4] 4.3 [3.1 ; 5.4] 4.3 [3.1 ; 5.4] 4.3 [3.1 ; 5.4] 4.3 [3.1 ; 5.4] 4.3 [3.1 ; 5.4] 4.3 [3.1 ; 5.4]
> 80 years old 6.8 [5.0 ; 8.6] 6.8 [5.0 ; 8.6] 6.8 [5.0 ; 8.6] 6.8 [5.0 ; 8.6] 6.8 [5.0 ; 8.6] 6.8 [5.0 ; 8.6] 6.8 [5.0 ; 8.6]
Perceived health
Very good 4.6 [4.0 ; 5.3] 3.5 [2.9 ; 4.0] 3.3 [2.8 ; 3.8] 1.8 [1.4 ; 2.2] 3.9 [3.4 ; 4.5] 3.7 [3.2 ; 4.3] 2.4 [1.9 ; 2.8]
Good 4.0 [3.5 ; 4.5] 3.1 [2.6 ; 3.6] 2.8 [2.3 ; 3.2] 2.1 [1.7 ; 2.5] 3.5 [3.1 ; 4.0] 3.2 [2.8 ; 3.7] 2.4 [2.0 ; 2.8]
Fair 4.8 [4.0 ; 5.6] 3.9 [3.2 ; 4.7] 3.7 [3.0 ; 4.4] 3.1 [2.5 ; 3.8] 4.2 [3.4 ; 5.0] 3.9 [3.2 ; 4.7] 3.4 [2.7 ; 4.1]
Poor/very poor 9.9 [7.6 ; 12.1] 8.8 [6.7 ; 10.9] 8.8 [6.7 ; 10.9] 8.1 [6.0 ; 10.1] 9.3 [7.2 ; 11.5] 9.3 [7.2 ; 11.5] 8.7 [6.5 ; 10.8]
Unknown 5.8 [5.2 ; 6.5] 4.7 [4.1 ; 5.2] 4.4 [3.8 ; 4.9] 2.8 [2.3 ; 3.2] 5.0 [4.5 ; 5.6] 4.7 [4.2 ; 5.3] 3.2 [2.7 ; 3.7]
ALD
With ALD 6.2 [5.3 ; 7.2] 5.7 [4.8 ; 6.7] 5.6 [4.7 ; 6.5] 5.2 [4.3 ; 6.1] 6.0 [5.0 ; 6.9] 5.8 [4.9 ; 6.7] 5.4 [4.5 ; 6.3]
Without ALD 4.8 [4.4 ; 5.1] 3.7 [3.4 ; 4.0] 3.4 [3.1 ; 3.7] 2.2 [2.0 ; 2.4] 4.1 [3.8 ; 4.4] 3.8 [3.5 ; 4.1] 2.6 [2.4 ; 2.9]
Unknown 3.8 [0.8 ; 6.8] 3.4 [0.5 ; 6.3] 3.4 [0.5 ; 6.3] 3.4 [0.5 ; 6.3] 3.4 [0.5 ; 6.3] 3.4 [0.5 ; 6.3] 3.4 [0.5 ; 6.3]
Chronic illness
With a chronic illness 5.0 [4.3 ; 5.7] 4.4 [3.8 ; 5.0] 4.2 [3.6 ; 4.8] 3.8 [3.2 ; 4.4] 4.7 [4.0 ; 5.3] 4.5 [3.9 ; 5.1] 4.1 [3.5 ; 4.7]
Without a chronic illness 4.5 [4.1 ; 5.0] 3.4 [3.0 ; 3.8] 3.1 [2.7 ; 3.5] 2.0 [1.7 ; 2.3] 3.9 [3.4 ; 4.3] 3.6 [3.2 ; 4.0] 2.5 [2.1 ; 2.8]
Unknown 5.9 [5.3 ; 6.5] 4.7 [4.2 ; 5.3] 4.4 [3.9 ; 5.0] 2.8 [2.4 ; 3.3] 5.1 [4.6 ; 5.7] 4.9 [4.3 ; 5.4] 3.3 [2.8 ; 3.8]
Employment status
Employed 3.6 [3.2 ; 4.1] 1.2 [0.9 ; 1.4] 1.2 [0.9 ; 1.4] 0.9 [0.7 ; 1.2] 2.1 [1.8 ; 2.5] 2.1 [1.8 ; 2.5] 1.7 [1.4 ; 2.0]
Retired 4.6 [3.9 ; 5.3] 4.6 [3.9 ; 5.3] 4.6 [3.9 ; 5.3] 4.4 [3.7 ; 5.1] 4.6 [3.9 ; 5.3] 4.6 [3.9 ; 5.3] 4.5 [3.8 ; 5.2]
Unemployed 13.7 [11.5 ; 15.8] 13.7 [11.5 ; 15.8] 9.0 [7.3 ; 10.8] 7.1 [5.5 ; 8.7] 13.7 [11.5 ; 15.8] 9.0 [7.3 ; 10.8] 7.4 [5.7 ; 9.0]
Students 4.3 [3.7 ; 4.8] 4.3 [3.7 ; 4.8] 4.2 [3.7 ; 4.8] 1.6 [1.2 ; 1.9] 4.3 [3.7 ; 4.8] 4.3 [3.7 ; 4.8] 1.8 [1.5 ; 2.2]
House wife/husband 8.9 [6.8 ; 10.9] 8.9 [6.8 ; 10.9] 8.9 [6.8 ; 10.9] 6.6 [4.8 ; 8.5] 8.9 [6.8 ; 10.9] 8.9 [6.8 ; 10.9] 6.9 [5.0 ; 8.8]
Other inactives 11.6 [8.6 ; 14.5] 11.6 [8.6 ; 14.5] 11.6 [8.6 ; 14.5] 10.4 [7.5 ; 13.2] 11.6 [8.6 ; 14.5] 11.6 [8.6 ; 14.5] 10.4 [7.5 ; 13.2]
Not known 20.8 [7.8 ; 33.9] 20.8 [7.8 ; 33.9] 20.8 [7.8 ; 33.9] 17.8 [6.1 ; 29.5] 20.8 [7.8 ; 33.9] 20.8 [7.8 ; 33.9] 17.8 [6.1 ; 29.5]
Income per CU
≤ 650€ 14.1 [12.0 ; 16.3] 13.1 [11.0 ; 15.2] 12.7 [10.6 ; 14.8] 10.2 [8.2 ; 12.1] 13.6 [11.5 ; 15.7] 13.2 [11.1 ; 15.3] 10.8 [8.8 ; 12.8]
651€ / 1 000€ 8.6 [7.4 ; 9.7] 7.4 [6.3 ; 8.4] 6.8 [5.8 ; 7.8] 4.7 [3.8 ; 5.5] 7.9 [6.8 ; 9.0] 7.3 [6.2 ; 8.3] 5.3 [4.4 ; 6.2]
1 001€ / 1 400€ 4.4 [3.7 ; 5.1] 3.5 [2.8 ; 4.1] 3.2 [2.6 ; 3.8] 2.4 [1.9 ; 2.9] 3.8 [3.2 ; 4.5] 3.6 [3.0 ; 4.2] 2.7 [2.2 ; 3.3]
1 401€ / 2 000€ 2.7 [2.1 ; 3.3] 1.7 [1.3 ; 2.2] 1.7 [1.2 ; 2.1] 1.4 [0.9 ; 1.8] 2.2 [1.7 ; 2.7] 2.1 [1.6 ; 2.6] 1.7 [1.3 ; 2.2]
2 001€ / 3 000€ 1.6 [1.0 ; 2.1] 0.7 [0.3 ; 1.1] 0.7 [0.3 ; 1.1] 0.4 [0.1 ; 0.8] 0.9 [0.5 ; 1.4] 0.9 [0.5 ; 1.4] 0.7 [0.3 ; 1.1]
> 3 000€ 3.6 [2.3 ; 5.0] 2.9 [1.7 ; 401] 2.4 [1.3 ; 3.5] 1.5 [0.6 ; 2.3] 3.2 [2.0 ; 4.5] 2.7 [1.6 ; 3.8] 1.7 [0.7 ; 2.6]
Unknown 5.4 [4.8 ; 6.0] 4.3 [3.7 ; 4.9] 3.9 [3.4 ; 4.5] 2.6 [2.2 ; 3.1] 4.7 [4.1 ; 5.3] 4.4 [3.8 ; 5.0] 3.1 [2.6 ; 3.6]
Indicator of social vulnerability*
Yes 9.0 [7.7 ; 10.2] 6.9 [5.8 ; 8.0] 6.3 [5.2 ; 7.3] 5.6 [4.6 ; 6.7] 7.8 [6.6 ; 9.0] 7.2 [6.1 ; 8.4] 6.5 [5.3 ; 7.6]
No  3.6 [3.2 ; 4.0] 2.7 [2.4 ; 3.1] 2.6 [2.2 ; 2.9] 2.1 [1.8 ; 2.4] 3.1 [2.7 ; 3.5] 2.9 [2.6 ; 3.3] 2.4 [2.1 ; 2.8]
Not known 6.6 [5.9 ; 7.4] 5.0 [4.4 ; 5.7] 4.5 [3.9 ; 5.1] 3.6 [3.0 ; 4.1] 5.6 [4.9 ; 6.2] 5.0 [4.4 ; 5.7] 4.1 [3.5 ; 4.7]
Material assistance from family or friends*
Yes 4.1 [3.6 ; 4.5] 3.0 [2.6 ; 3.4] 2.8 [2.4 ; 3.1] 2.3 [1.9 ; 2.6] 3.5 [3.1 ; 3.9] 3.3 [2.8 ; 3.7] 2.7 [2.3 ; 3.1]
No 7.1 [5.8 ; 8.4] 5.7 [4.5 ; 6.8] 5.3 [4.2 ; 6.5] 4.7 [3.7 ; 5.8] 6.3 [5.1 ; 7.6] 6.0 [4.8 ; 7.2] 5.4 [4.2 ; 6.5]
Yes but dare not ask  5.0 [3.8 ; 6.3] 4.2 [3.1 ; 5.3] 3.9 [2.8 ; 4.9] 3.4 [2.4 ; 4.4] 4.3 [3.2 ; 5.4] 4.0 [2.9 ; 5.0] 3.5 [2.5 ; 4.5]
Not known 6.5 [5.8 ; 7.2] 5.0 [4.3 ; 5.6] 4.5 [3.8 ; 5.1] 3.6 [3.0 ; 4.1] 5.5 [4.8 ; 6.1] 5.0 [4.4 ; 5.6] 4.1 [3.5 ; 4.6]
Risk preferences*
Risk-seekers 8.1 [6.0 ; 10.1] 4.9 [3.3 ; 6.6] 4.7 [3.0 ; 6.4] 4.0 [2.4 ; 5.5] 6.6 [4.7 ; 8.5] 6.4 [4.5 ; 8.2] 5.5 [3.8 ; 7.3]
Risk-averse 4.4 [4.0 ; 4.8] 3.5 [3.1 ; 3.8] 3.2 [2.8 ; 3.6] 2.7 [2.4 ; 3.1] 3.8 [3.5 ; 4.2] 3.6 [3.2 ; 4.0] 3.1 [2.7 ; 3.4]
Not known 6.6 [5.9 ; 7.3] 5.0 [4.4 ; 5.6] 4.5 [3.9 ; 5.0] 3.6 [3.0 ; 4.1] 5.5 [4.9 ; 6.2] 5.0 [4.4 ; 5.6] 4.0 [3.5 ; 4.6]
Time preferences*
For the present 7.3 [5.9 ; 8.7] 5.7 [4.5 ; 6.9] 5.6 [4.4 ; 6.8] 4.9 [3.7 ; 6.1] 6.6 [5.3 ; 8.0] 6.5 [5.2 ; 7.9] 5.7 [4.4 ; 7.0]
For the future 4.2 [3.8 ; 4.7] 3.2 [2.9 ; 3.6] 3.0 [2.6 ; 3.3] 2.5 [2.1 ; 2.8] 3.6 [3.2 ; 4.0] 3.4 [3.0 ; 3.8] 2.9 [2.5 ; 3.2]
Not known 6.6 [5.9 ; 7.3] 5.0 [4.4 ; 5.6] 4.5 [3.9 ; 5.0] 3.6 [3.0 ; 4.1] 5.5 [4.9 ; 6.2] 5.0 [4.4 ; 5.6] 4.1 [3.5 ; 4.7]
Total 5.0 [4.7 ; 5.3] 4.0 [3.7 ; 4.3] 3.7 [3.4 ; 4.0] 2.7 [2.4 ; 2.9] 4.4 [4.1 ; 4.7] 4.1 [3.8 ; 4.4] 3.1 [2.8 ; 3.3]
Among + 15 years old 5.2 [4.9 ; 5.6] 4.0 [3.7 ; 4.3] 3.7 [3.4 ; 4.0] 3.0 [2.7 ; 3.3] 4.5 [4.2 ; 4.8] 4.2 [3.8 ; 4.5] 3.5 [3.2 ; 3.8]
Among uninsured in 2012 100 [100 ; 100] 79.9 [77.3 ; 82.4] 74.5 [71.8 ; 77.2] 53.5 [50.4 ; 56.7] 87.9 [85.9 ; 90.0] 82,6 [80.2 ; 84.9] 61.8 [58.7 ; 64.8]
* Among those 15 years old and older.
Source: ESPS, Irdes, 2012.
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Table A3 Modelling of  non-coverage among the entire population
Observed 
in 2012
Simulated, assuming no 
exemptions
Simulated, assuming 
exemptions
S(1) S(1+2) S(1+2+3) S(1) S(1+2) S(1+2+3)
EM Pr. EM Pr. EM Pr. EM Pr. EM Pr. EM Pr. EM Pr.
Gender - Ref: Male
Female -1.2 *** -0.8 *** -0.7 *** -0.7 *** -1.0 *** -0.9 *** -0.9 ***
Age  (Ref: 51-60 years old)
- 18 years old 2.0 ns 0.8 ns 0.5 ns 0.4 ns 2.1 * 1.8 ns 1.7 ns
18/30 years old 4.2 *** 2.1 ** 1.6 ** 0.8 * 4.1 *** 3.5 *** 2.6 ***
31/40 years old 1.2 ns 0.7 ns 0.2 ns -0.0 ns 1.3 * 0.8 ns 0.3 ns
41/50 years old 0.4 ns 0.2 ns 0.1 ns -0.1 ns 0.2 ns 0.1 ns -0.0 ns
61/70 years old 0.5 ns 0.4 ns 0.3 ns 0.8 ns 0.4 ns 0.4 ns 1.0 ns
71/80 years old 0.9 ns 0.6 ns 0.5 ns 1.2 ns 0.7 ns 0.6 ns 1.4 ns
+ 80 years old 2.9 * 2.1 * 1.9 * 2.6 ** 2.4 * 2.2 * 3.0 **
With  ALD (Ref: No)
Yes 0.3 ns 0.2 ns 0.3 ns 0.2 ns 0.4 ns 0.4 ns 0.3 ns
Not known -1.6 ns -0.7 ns -0.5 ns 0.2 ns -1.2 ns -1.0 ns -0.1 ns
Chronic illness (Ref: No)
Yes -0.9 * -0.5 ns -0.4 ns -0.1 ns -0.6 ns -0.5 ns -0.2 ns
Not known 0.4 ns 0.5 ns 0.6 ns 0.5 ns 0.7 ns 0.9 ns 0.5 ns
Perceived health (Ref: Very good/good)
Fair 0.2 ns 0.1 ns 0.0 ns -0.1 ns -0.0 ns -0.0 ns -0.1 ns
Poor/very poor 2.3 * 1.4 * 1.5 * 0.7 ns 1.7 * 1.8 * 1.1 ns
Not known -0.2 ns -0.3 ns -0.4 ns -0.2 ns -0.5 ns -0.6 ns -0.2 ns
Employment status (Ref: Employed)
Retired 1.4 ns 5.4 *** 5.0 *** 2.6 *** 3.8 *** 3.4 *** 2.0 **
Unemployed 4.1 *** 11.2 *** 7.2 *** 4.1 *** 7.0 *** 3.8 *** 2.2 ***
School children; students -0.8 ns 3.5 *** 3.5 *** 1.1 * 1.0 ns 1.0 ns -0.3 ns
House wife/husband 3.2 ** 9.2 *** 8.6 *** 4.7 *** 6.2 *** 5.7 *** 3.4 ***
Other economically inactive 4.6 *** 11.4 *** 10.6 *** 7.4 *** 7.9 *** 7.3 *** 5.4 ***
Not known 12.9 * 23.2 ** 23.1 ** 17.6 ** 17.7 ** 17.5 ** 13.5 *
Income per CU (Ref: Over 2,000€)
Less than or equal to 650€ 10.2 *** 8.0 *** 8.9 *** 8.1 *** 9.5 *** 10.4 *** 9.7 ***
Between 651€ and 1,200€ 7.1 *** 5.5 *** 5.7 *** 3.8 *** 6.5 *** 6.7 *** 4.9 ***
Between 1,201€ and 1,400€ 2.5 *** 2.3 *** 2.4 ** 2.0 *** 2.6 *** 2.8 *** 2.3 ***
Between 1,401€ and 2,000€ 0.7 ns 0.4 ns 0.6 ns 0.7 ns 0.8 ns 0.9 ns 1.0 ns
Not known 3.4 *** 2.9 *** 3.0 *** 2.0 *** 3.4 *** 3.5 *** 2.5 ***
Indicator of social vulnerability (Ref: No)
Yes 3.2 *** 1.7 *** 1.5 ** 1.2 *** 2.5 *** 2.3 *** 1.7 ***
Not known 1.8 ** 1.6 ** 1.5 ** 1.0 * 1.8 ** 1.7 ** 1.1 *
Material assistance from family or friends (Ref: Yes)
No 1.0 ns 0.6 ns 0.5 ns 0.3 ns 0.8 ns 0.8 ns 0.4 ns
Yes but dare not ask  0.7 ns 0.6 ns 0.5 ns 0.4 ns 0.4 ns 0.3 ns 0.2 ns
Not known -0.7 ns -0.6 ns -0.5 ns -1.1 *** -0.6 ns -0.5 ns -1.2 **
Time preferences (Ref: For the future)
For the present 1.1 * 0.5 ns 0.6 ns 0.3 ns 0.9 ns 0.9 * 0.5 ns
Not known 0.9 ns 0.1 ns 0.1 ns 0.5 ns 0.7 ns 0.7 ns 1.0 ns
Risk preferences (Ref: Risk-averse)
Risk seeking 1.6 * 0.2 ns 0.4 ns 0.6 ns 1.0 ns 1.2 ns 1.2 *
Not known -0.2 ns -0.0 ns -0.1 ns -0.5 ns -0.5 ns -0.6 ns -1.0 ns
Pr(Y=1/X=mean) 0.051 0.041 0.038 0.026 0.045 0.042 0.030
EM: Marginal eff ects calculated in points; Pr: Probability that the marginal eff ect is equal to 0.
***: p<0.001; **: 0.001<p<=0.01; *:0.01<p<=0.05.
Source: ESPS, Irdes, 2012.
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Table A5 Description of  the population who would remain without CHI after the ANI law
With 
CHI 
in 2012
Without 
CH
in 2012
Simulations without exemption Simulations with exemptions
Become insured Remain uninsured Become insured Remain uninsured
(1) (1+2) (1+2+3) (1) (1+2) (1+2+3) (1) (1+2) (1+2+3) (1) (1+2) (1+2+3)
Gender
Male 47.4 55.0 60.1 59.5 54.4 53.8 53.5 55.6 60.7 59.7 53.3 54.3 54.1 56.1
Female 52.6 45.0 39.9 40.5 45.6 46.2 46.5 44.4 39.3 40.3 46.7 45.7 45.9 43.9
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Age
<18 years old 22.6 18.1 0 0 26.1 22.7 24.3 11.2 0 0 28.7 20.6 22.0 11.6
18/30 years old 13.6 22.6 34.1 38.4 29.4 19.7 17.2 16.7 24.2 33.5 25.5 22.4 20.3 20.8
31/40 years old 13.5 13.3 23.5 25.6 17.8 10.7 9.0 9.4 22.2 25.7 18.1 12.1 10.7 10.3
41/50 years old 13.3 12.1 24.4 20.9 14.6 9.0 9.1 10.0 30.2 23.2 14.8 9.7 9.8 10.5
51/60 years old 13.5 11.3 16.9 14.3 10.5 9.8 10.2 11.9 21.6 16.3 11.3 9.8 10.2 11.3
61/70 years old 11.3 9.3 1.1 0.8 1.8 11.4 12.2 15.9 1.8 1.2 1.6 10.4 11.0 14.1
70/80 years old 6.6 5.6 0 0 0 7.0 7.5 10.5 0 0 0 6.4 6.8 9.1
> 80 years old 5.5 7.7 0 0 0 9.6 10.3 14.3 0 0 0 8.7 9.3 12.4
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Perceived health
Very good 21.3 19.6 23.8 22.5 25.5 18.5 18.6 14.5 24.1 22.1 25.1 19.0 19.1 16.2
Good 33.0 25.8 27.9 30.0 26.7 25.3 24.3 25.0 22.8 27.5 26.5 26.2 25.4 25.4
Fair 17.6 16.7 15.2 15.6 12.5 17.1 17.1 20.5 17.3 17.3 12.6 16.7 16.6 19.3
Poor/Very poor 5.0 10.4 5.7 4.5 4.1 11.6 12.4 15.9 4.5 3.1 3.2 11.2 12.0 14.9
Unknown 23.1 27.5 27.4 27.4 31.3 27.5 27.5 24.2 31.3 30.1 32.6 27.0 26.9 24.3
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
ALD
With ALD 16.0 20.1 8.2 8.7 7.4 23.2 24.1 31.2 7.3 8.3 6.9 21.9 22.7 28.4
Without ALD 83.5 79.4 91.6 91.2 92.5 76.4 75.4 68.1 92.4 91.5 93.0 77.7 76.9 71.0
Unknown 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.6
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Chronic illness
With 25.3 25.2 14.9 15.3 13.0 27.8 28.6 35.7 13.0 14.2 12.0 26.8 27.5 33.4
Without 49.5 44.6 55.6 55.6 53.4 41.8 40.8 37.0 55.2 55.4 53.3 43.1 42.3 39.2
Unknown 25.2 30.2 29.5 29.1 33.6 30.4 30.6 27.3 31.8 30.4 34.7 30.0 30.2 27.5
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Employment status
Employed 41.3 29.5 100 78.9 47.0 11.8 12.6 14.3 100,0 69.1 40.9 19.9 21.1 22.5
Retired 21.5 19.5 0 0 1.5 24.5 26.2 35.2 0 0 1.3 22.2 23.7 30.8
Unemploymed 5.2 15.9 0 21.1 16.4 19.9 14.1 15.4 0 30.9 19.1 18.0 12.7 13.8
Students 26.0 22.1 0 0 30.1 27.6 29.6 15.1 0 0 33.2 25.1 26.7 15.2
House wife/husband 3.7 6.8 0 0 3.7 8.5 9.2 9.6 0 0 3.9 7.8 8.3 8.6
Other inactives 2.2 5.5 0 0 1.2 6.9 7.4 9.3 0 0 1.5 6.3 6.7 8.0
Unknown 0.1 0.7 0 0 0.2 0.9 1.0 1.2 0 0 0.3 0.8 0.9 1,0
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Income per CU per month
≤ 650 € 4.8 15.2 5.5 6.0 9.1 17.6 18.3 20.4 4.8 5.8 9.4 16.6 17.2 18.7
651€ /1,000€ 13.1 23.4 16.0 19.2 22.9 25.2 24.8 23.7 15.2 20.2 23.4 24.5 24.0 23.4
1,001€ /1,400€ 19.3 16.7 17.7 17.3 16.6 16.5 16.5 16.8 18.0 17.3 16.6 16.6 16.6 16.8
1,401€ /2,000€ 21.6 11.4 20.4 16.8 12.2 9.1 9.5 10.6 19.0 14.2 10.7 10.3 10.8 11.8
2,001€ /3,000€ 12.3 3.7 10.2 8.0 5.7 2.1 2.2 2.0 12.3 8.5 5.4 2.5 2.7 2.6
> 3,000€ 4.9 3.5 3.3 4.6 4.4 3.5 3.1 2.6 3.2 5.1 4.9 3.5 3.1 2.6
Unknown 24.0 26.2 27.1 28.1 29.0 26,0 25.6 23.8 27.6 28.9 29.6 26.0 25.7 24.1
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Indicator of social vulnerability*
Yes 13.8 24.6 24.5 24.8 21.9 22.4 23.4 20.8 24.7 24.6 26.6 25.0 24.9 26.5
No  58.3 39.0 38.4 36.1 38.3 36.5 33.8 37.1 39.2 40.2 39.6 39.4 40.4 40.0
Unknown 27.9 36.4 37.1 39.1 39.9 41.1 42.8 42.1 36.1 35.2 33.8 35.6 34.7 33.5
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Material assistance from family or friends*
Yes 51.7 39.4 43.3 41.8 41.7 38.4 37.8 39.1 38.2 38.3 37.7 39.5 39.8 39.5
No  12.1 16.8 14.5 14,0 13.3 12.8 12.6 12.5 17.5 17.9 19.2 17.4 17.8 18.9
Yes but dare not ask 7.7 7.3 5.2 5.8 5.7 7.6 7.7 6.9 8.0 8,0 8.5 7.3 7.2 7.5
Unknown 28.6 36.5 37.0 38.5 39.3 41.1 41.9 41.6 36.4 35.7 34.6 35.8 35.2 34.1
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Risk preferences*
Risk-averse 66.2 54.6 48.1 48.1 49,0 46.8 47.2 48.9 56.6 57.4 58.6 55.9 56.5 57.5
Risk-seeking 5.3 8.5 14.0 11.8 10.2 10.9 8.6 8.1 6.8 7.0 7.2 8.1 8.4 8.7
Unknown 28.5 36.9 37.9 40.1 40.8 42.4 44.2 43.1 36.6 35.6 34.2 36.1 35.1 33.9
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Time preferences*
For the futur 61.7 49.1 49.1 48.8 48.2 48.8 48.5 48.0 49.1 49.3 49.8 49.2 49.3 49.7
For the present 9.6 13.6 12.7 10.8 10.9 8.9 7.3 9.0 13.9 14.8 15.6 14.4 15.3 15.9
Unknown 28.7 37.3 38.2 40.4 40.9 42.4 44.2 43.0 37.0 35.9 34.7 36.4 35.5 34.4
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Number 21,638 1,172 234 288 569 938 884 603 144 198 473 1,028 974 699
* Among those 15 years old and older.
Source: ESPS, Irdes, 2012.
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In France, access to health care greatly depends on having a Complementary Health Insurance coverage 
(CHI). Thus, the generalisation of CHI became a core factor in the national health strategy created by 
the government in 2013. The first measure has been to compulsorily extend employer-sponsored CHI 
to all private sector employees on January 1st, 2016 and improve its portability coverage for unem-
ployed former employees for up to 12 months. Based on data from the 2012 Health, Health Care and 
Insurance survey, this article provides a simulation of the likely effects of this mandate on CHI coverage 
and related inequalities in the general population by age, health status, socio-economic characteristics 
and time and risk preferences. We show that the non-coverage rate that was estimated to be 5% in 2012 
will drop to 4% following the generalisation of employer-sponsored CHI and to 3.7% after accounting 
for portability coverage. With its focus on private sector employees, the policy is likely to do little for 
populations that would benefit most from additional insurance coverage while expanding coverage for 
other populations that appear to place little value on CHI. Indeed, the mandate could reduce the rela-
tionship between non-coverage and time and risk preferences without eliminating social inequalities as 
the most vulnerable populations are expected to remain more often without CHI.
